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Abstract: As Nepal opened her door for international communities, it emerged from a 
barter system to global economy. During the last five decades (1950/51 – 2000/01) the 
country has witnessed different motley politico-economic decision making systems. The 
initial years in 1950s after emancipation from a very autocratic regime of more than 
100 years were a political mess. The second half of 1950s was in the process 
streamlining, but another unfortunate political incident of 1960 pushed the country in 
different direction. The socioeconomic development of 1961 to 1990 was very sluggish, 
regionally biased, and unproductive, which forced the increment of mass poverty level 
in Nepal. The socioeconomic progress after 1990 seems encouraging but the real 
achievements have been shadowed by the weakness of politico-economical characters 
of ruling leaders. In last 50 years, Nepal followed the modernization path and 
experienced lots of developmental patch-ups, which did not sustain and enhance the 
productivity at the local level. Rather, the country witnessed a persistent poverty in spite 
of huge national and international expenses. In order to break the spurring poverty 
level the village economy needs to be enhanced with equal emphasis on human or social 
and ecological capitals enrichment activities.  
 
 
The modern socioeconomic development of Nepal started only after 1950 from a 
very low level of socioeconomic endowments. Prior to 1950, Nepal lacked any 
system of civil service, record of public welfare and accounting, basic social, 
economic, and demographic indicators (USAID, 1973). Development planning 
began with the establishment of a central planning agency, the National Planning 
Commission, in 1956. The country completed the Ninth Five-year Plan in the year 
2002, and pursuing the 10th Five year Plan. The last five decades of economic 
growth in Nepal have not turned out as expected. One of the key indicators of  
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socioeconomic development reveals that Nepal has the highest poverty level in 
South Asia (UNDP, 2001). An estimated 44 percent of rural households where 85 
percent of the 24 million people reside and 23 percent of urban households live 
below the poverty line. The 1995/1996 Household Survey reported that about 42 
percent of the population lived below the poverty line (with a Gini index of 36.7), 
and approximately the same poverty rate was reported in the 1984/1985 Multi-
purpose Household Budget Survey (CBS, 1996). Both studies measured poverty 
level on the basis of minimum daily calorie intake, and found either persistence or 
even spurred poverty condition. The analytically unanswered question is why the 
poverty level is spurring in spite of huge national and international efforts. Is Nepal 
merely lacking a comprehensive development strategy for economic growth vis-à-
vis socioeconomic development (Karan and Ishii, 1996) or is development really 
failed in Nepal (Pandey, 1999)?  
 This essay is a retrospection of the major socioeconomic development policies 
that Nepal adopted in last five decades from 1950/51 to 2000/01. The following 
units discuss economic growth and socioeconomic development phases of modern 
Nepal. A few major economic measures and resources mobilization policies and 
barriers of development are discussed. A structural analysis of socioeconomic 
transactions of the entire economy is examined, and key policy strategies regarding 
poverty and sustainability are argued.  
 
 
T H E  E C O N O M Y  B E F O R E  1 9 5 0  
 
As Nepal freed from geo-political isolation in 1950, modernization paradigm has 
driven economic growth, albeit socioeconomic development in Nepal2. The 
modern theory of economic growth introduced by Harrod (1939) and Domar 
(1946) evolved different perspectives of modernization. In the Western world, 
modernization occurred through the process of commercialization, whereas in 
many non-western areas, it is largely due to commercialization and bureaucracy 
(Apter, 1987), but in many eastern countries modernization is portrayed as 
industrialization, urbanization, and bureaucratization (Zhang and Darwin, 1994).  
 Traditionally, the Nepalese economy is an agriculture based village economy 
that evolved through the barter system among different economic activities existed 
in the villages. Major agricultural crops are rice, corn, oilseeds, cotton, jute, and 
sugarcane. The economy from the village to the state level was integrated in the 
late 18th century, when a warrior King P. N. Shah of Gorkha, initiated a political 
unification process to build a new Nepal. The Divine Counsel of the King guided 
the policy for the State in matters of agriculture, trade, and governance. One of the 
major problems of that economy was a lack of capital in the state’s treasury 
(Regmi, 1971). That might be one reason why the state even allocated land to the 
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government employees as a pay. War also became a major source of revenue for 
the government. For instance, the East India Company that lost a war with Nepal in 
1816 agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 200,000 per year, which is popularly known as the 
Sugauli Treaty. Likewise, the rulers of Nepal were also receiving an annual sum of 
Rs.10,000 from the Tibetan government, as the latter lost to former in a war of 
1855-56 (Rose, 1971). Nonetheless, during the late 18th century government’s 
annual revenue estimated to be about 25 hundred thousand Rupees (Kirkpatrick, 
1986). The main sources of revenue were duties on imports and exports. Major 
importable items were gold and silver, whereas exportable commodities were 
mostly forests and natural products, and agricultural produces. Kirkpatrick also 
mentioned the iron and copper mines, and that the latter were of excellent quantity. 
The metal craft industry was one of the prosperous industrial sectors and it is still a 
major cottage industry in the capital city and other areas.      
 Since the King was the absolute head of the state, all social and economic 
decisions as well as political resolutions were final. Later on, during early 19th 
century, the Kingship came under control of a certain ruling class - the Ranas, 
whose different family members ruled the nation from 1846 to 1950. The role of 
King as decision maker was practically eliminated, and the Ranas became the 
decisive authority. Socioeconomic development during the Rana period was 
virtually nonexistent. There was no national accounting system of income and 
expenditures during the Rana regime. Major sources of revenue were taxes on 
imports and exports. The rulers collected money through the sale of the natural 
resources like forest products, and wild animals. As the Ranas had maintained a 
good relationship with administrators of the East India Company and during the 
end of 19th century the British East India Company was expanding railway 
networks in the north plains of India, which required hardwood, and the forests of 
Nepal got a huge market (Ghimire,1992). Unfortunately, revenue generated by the 
sale of forests went to the rulers, not to the public. Historically, Kathmandu was a 
crossroad of trans-Himalayan trade between Tibet and India, and other parts of the 
South Asia, and the Ranas as rulers were also able to exploit such trade. All sorts of 
revenue and economic opportunities were the prerogatives of the rulers – the 
Ranas. These rulers spent little on public welfare during their 104 years rule. 
Regmi (1971) discussed the state of economic during the Rana regime. Whatever 
they got from the people or other taxable sources was their own private property, 
which they enjoyed at home or abroad. It won’t be an exaggeration to say that 
before 1950, the Nepalese economy was exclusively controlled and operated by the 
Rana rulers and their families and allies who exclusively kept Nepal isolated from 
outside influence and disenchanted any sociopolitical change for more than a 
century. The family reign of Ranas ended in 1950 by the Nepali Congress led 
people’s movement.  
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T H E  E C O N O M Y  O F  T R A N S I T I O N  ( 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 6 0 )  
 
After the end of the Rana reign, the role of King as a head of the state was re-
established, and political parties emerged. Socioeconomic development and 
modernization of the country became the primary goal of the civilian rulers. The 
first half of the 1950s opened the door of the country to foreign dignitaries. With 
the establishment of the United States Technical Cooperation Division in 1952, 
Nepal indicated that it was ready to accept development aid.  At the beginning of 
the 1950s instability of successive governments lead to a little confusion among 
people, who were not aware enough about the rights and responsibilities. The first 
scientific census of 1951/52 indicated that out of a total population of 8.2 million 
people only two percent were literate – a key indicator of the social development. 
Land reforms and tenancy rights were the major issues of public concern, so the 
Land Act of 1957 was introduced to overcome eroding confidence in the political 
parties. This Act was expected to remedy the problem of insecure tenancy rights 
and regulated rents (Regmi, 1962). Likewise, forests were nationalized in 1956 and 
became the property of the government. The political confusion was ameliorated 
only after the first general election, held in 1959. After that election, the first 
elected government in Nepal of the Nepali Congress – a social democratic party, 
enforced another landmark law concerning privileged land ownership - the Birta 
Abolition Act of 1959. This law aimed to reduce the power of feudal landlords. As 
the Nepali Congress government determined to overhaul the socioeconomic 
structure, and bureaucratic systems through its social democratic philosophy, the 
then King Mahendra did a Royal coup in December 1960 and seized the parliament 
and its authority. Nevertheless, the average annual gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth rate for the period 1950s was reported about 2.4 percent. 
 
 
T H E  E C O N O M Y  I N  B E T WE E N  1 9 6 1  - 1 9 9 0   
 
In 1961, King Mahendra after overthrowing the multiparty democracy and banning 
political parties introduced his own political system – party less Panchayati system. 
By the introduction of this non-party political system the King became the absolute 
decision making authority, and pursued a state controlled mixed economic 
philosophy – a symptom of autocratic regime. This system lasted for about 30 
years, so is mainly responsible for socioeconomic progress or loss in Nepal after 
she opened her door to international community in 1950s. Although the party-less 
system attempted to stimulate economic growth by its so-called ‘mixed economic 
philosophy’, it had little success. The economic growth rate during the Panchayati 
system (1961 to 1990) was very slow and even negative (Figure 1) if compared 
with that of population growth rate. Consequently, per capita real income thus grew 
marginally less than one percent. So, overall economic growth during the thirty 
years of the Panchayat system was sluggish though may be better than during the 
earlier autocratic period of the Ranas, before 1950. Khadka (1994) extensively 
discusses the Panchayati economic system and its failures. 
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Figure 1. Growth Rates of Gross Domestic Product and Population in Nepal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nepal entered an economic crisis in the 1960s. A crisis of structural 
underdevelopment of the economy which is spatial and chronic due to: 
 
(i) The higher growth rate of population than agricultural productivity, 
(ii) The state’s revenue generation attitude rather than stimulating the 
production and expansion of the economic bases,   
(iii) Virtual lack of employment opportunities outside agriculture, and 
extensification, instead of intensification of agriculture that led to 
further environmental deterioration (Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon, 
2001). 
 
During the Panchayati period, few unique characters of the economic growth were 
introduced. Nepal’s economic activities have become the function of donor money. 
Nepal would have received more foreign aid per head than any other country, but 
the dismal side is that much of the money was returned back to donor countries. 
MacFarlane (1994) argued that the impacts of such donors were on a small 
segment of the society and the growth of towns. The aid surplus generated in the 
rural areas was siphoned off to the Kathmandu valley and surrounding areas. On 
the other hand, people started to move from rural areas to towns where they could 
find more physical facilities than available in the villages. The growth of the urban 
population shows that in-country migration in search of a better life was 
substantial. In 1951/52 only 0.24 million people lived in the towns, that figure grew 
to 1.7 million in 1991 and to 2.32 million in 2001. Macfarlane further observed that 
a small affluent class of people in Kathmandu enjoyed a first class world standard 
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of living, whereas 95 percent of the people lived in poverty. The urban biased 
development efforts of the Panchyati system led to massive inequalities among 
different regions and social classes. Unbalanced economic growth was evident 
between urban and rural, east and west, hill and plain areas. Forty hill or mountain 
districts out of seventy five total districts in the country fell below the national 
level of socioeconomic standards (Ojha, 1997). This implies that economic growth 
in some areas of the country was at the cost of other regions which could be 
another indicator of centralization of resources vis-à-vis failure of successive plans.  
 
 
T H E  E C O N O M Y  I N  1 9 9 0 S  
 
The People’s Movement of 1990 overthrew the party less political system, 
Panchayat, and restored the multiparty politics. One of the fundamental changes 
after the restoration of a multiparty system was the decision making process at 
executive level. In the new parliamentary system, the council of ministers was 
responsible for economic as well as development policy decisions that were 
accountable to the parliament. The new political system also started to follow the 
market strategies introduced by the Nepali Congress which ruled most of the period 
in the nineties. Originally, the Nepali Congress envisaged itself as a social 
democratic party, but after thirty years of political struggle against the Panchayati 
system, and restoration of the multiparty polity in 1990, it totally relied on market 
philosophy that could have overlooked local socioeconomic structure particularly 
in the village economy. Nevertheless, modern paradigms of development were 
cemented by the National Planning Commission (NPC) on its 8th Five-Year Plan 
(1992-1997) so that it could achieve sustained economic growth, alleviate poverty, 
and reduce regional disparities. The government expected to follow the 
development approaches as outlined in the Eighth Plan, which were: 
 
(i) market oriented, open, and liberalized economic approaches, 
(ii) decentralization of policy by devolution of power to the local bodies, 
(iii) regional and rural development, 
(iv) mobilize the private sector and limit the role of public sector, and  
(v)  encourage the involvement of civic societies in the process of 
socioeconomic development (NPC, 1992, and 1997).  
 
Further, His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (HMGN) introduced a concept of the 
long term development in the 9th Five – Year Plan (1997-2002). One of the goals of 
long term development is to reduce the poverty line below 10 percent by the end of 
12th Five year plan, i.e., by 2017. A comparative economic growth in terms of GDP 
contributing activities in the country is depicted in Table 1. One of the salient 
features of this economy is the increased GDP contribution from non-agricultural 
sectors, which is about 62 percent. HMGN is determined to increase the GDP 
contribution from non-agricultural sectors. Liberalization, privatization, and land 
appropriation were some major policy initiatives different governments in the 
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nineties. Increase economic growth and decrease population growth rates are the 
traditional strategies to meet that goal along with some additional conventional 
programs such as employment generation, production and productivity 
enhancement, good governance, and human resources development. 
 
 
Table 1.  Sector-Wise GDP Contribution (on Percentage Basis) 
 
Sectors 1990/91 2000/01* 
 
Agriculture, irrigation and forestry  47.47 37.9 
Industry, mining and quarrying 6.74 9.5 
Electricity, gas and water 0.77 1.8 
Construction 9.25 10.01 
Trade, hotel, and transport 10.52 11.5 
Transport and communication 6.55 8.4 
Finance and real state 9.45 10.6 
Community and social services 9.23 10.2 
* estimates   
 
 
Despite early warnings on the wrong path of development HMGN overlooked 
people oriented plans, policies, and programs, and over emphasized the capital 
intensive sectors such as factories, dams, roads, which could show immediate 
results but neglected local economic considerations (Hagen, 1971). Subsequently, 
the government seemed proud of owning more than 60 public enterprises, which 
ranged from cigarette to cement manufacturing, distilleries, oil supply, housing, 
lumber, and brick kilns. As of now, as country competes with international market, 
many of the state-owned enterprises in Nepal are labeled as sick industries due to 
their dependence on the taxpayers’ money. The Economic Surveys published by 
the Ministry of Finance show that all the public enterprises (manufacturing sector) 
were in losses in the 1990s. The governments decided to privatize some of these 
public enterprises so that the private sector would be involved in the national 
building process. In the 1990s, 16 public enterprises were privatized, and the list of 
agencies to leave government control is very long including such agencies as 
cigarette producing, distillery, lime stone crushing and so on3. The main problems 
of the process and prospects for industrialization in Nepal range from human 
resources to capital mobilization, raw materials, inconsistent government policies, 
bribery, incentives, and the loan system, and a lack of coordination (Zivetz, 1992). 
The pace of industrialization was also hindered by the presence of a small domestic 
market, low income, scarce raw materials, low skill and geographical conditions. 
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Local manufacturing industries have low productivity compared to foreign firms 
with high capital intensity (Koirala and Koshal, 1999). The country has a 
comparative advantage mainly in unskilled labor intensive, traditional skill 
intensive high value or low volume / or weight goods (Adhikari, 1998).  Foreign 
investment has been beneficial to both the foreign investors and the national 
economy in Nepal (Chitrakar and  Weiss, 1995 ), but policy reforms in the 
industrial sector are yet to be in line with comparative advantages (Sharma, 2001). 
However, the manufacturing sector’s annual real GDP contribution increased from 
one percent in 1970s to about 10 percent in late 1990s. 
 
A g r i c u l t u r e  a n d  L a n d  R e f o r m  
 
Agriculture and land reforms are also tied with poverty alleviation in the planning 
documents. Since prehistoric times, agriculture has been the backbone of the 
Nepalese economy, so people keep a unique value to land. According to the 1961 
Census, 97.1 percent of people living in the rural areas were entirely dependent 
upon agriculture. The same Census also revealed a very unequal farmland 
distribution pattern among the Nepalese households. For instance, about 75 percent 
of households had one or less than one hectare of land and eight percent of 
households owns 39 percent of cultivated land. In past fifty years, there had been 
many attempts to appropriate the large land holdings and to distribute land to 
landless people, as well as to secure tenancy rights, but almost all such efforts 
failed. The reason could be politico-bureaucratic inertia and corruption in the 
process of land appropriation. After the Royal coup in 1960, King Mahendra 
introduced a comprehensive land reform program in 1964 with a new Land Act-
1964. The land reform program had acute social and psychological consequences, 
but had little impact on agrarian structure (Regmi, 1977). Land reform was one of 
the early prescriptions of the donors for many Asian countries, because the hidden 
objective was to check further growth of communism (Ladejinsky, 1977). The 
outcome of the 1964 Land Reform effort was insignificant. For example, the 
government was able to confiscate only 66,000 hectares of land above the ceiling, 
though the expectation was for nearly 600,000 hectares, and out of which only 
34,000 hectares were redistributed (KC, 1986). Again, the 2001 summer 
parliamentary session of Nepal passed another so-called revolutionary Land Bill 
that reduced the legal size of land holding per family which is as 7 hectors in Terai, 
1.1 in Kathmandu valley, and 2.75 hectares in hills. A political pronouncement was 
made without weighing up of socioeconomic implications, and exclusive of any 
schemes and information of land appropriation and redistribution. The new land 
ceilings are based essentially on perceived differences in regional population 
density and subjective judgment (Thapa, 2001). The country has yet to investigate 
the outcome of the 2001 land appropriation measures. Consequently, land 
allocation to the so-called landless people has become a never-ending process since 
the 1960s without any significant positive outcome (Shrestha, 2001).  
 Land distribution is further fragmented because of the land inheritance system 
in a typical Nepali family structure. Land is the basic form of family wealth and 
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income generating sources. Children do have the heredity rights to parental 
property including the land. As a family grows; children as they mature would like 
to be independent, either parent will give their parts of land to their offspring, 
particularly to son (s) or they will ask to their parents for some land so that s/he 
will be able to take care of him/herself by land-based agricultural activities. 
Offspring may switch to other businesses by selling the part or all of the land 
obtained from their parents. This system of land inheritance and allocation between 
or among offspring and parents reduces the land ownership size per family, which 
depends on the stock of land owned by parents, and family size. Eventually, in 
each successive generation, available land will be further fragmented. This kind of 
land inheritance system primarily hampers the poor families who have less land. 
The poor will further become destitute due to the lack of sufficient land to feed 
them. For example, if one family has two offspring and three hectares of land, and 
if the parents wish to distribute their land equally among themselves, each will end 
up with one hectare. This family may survive at the subsistence level, but what will 
happen to the next generation? The dynamics of family multiplication and land 
fragmentation is ongoing. It is estimated that nearly 1.2 million out of total 4.2 
million families do not have any lands (CBS, 2001).  
 On the other side, concern on land productivity was simply ignored. For 
example, between 1961/62 to 1980/81 there was an increase in the amount of 
cropland by 1.7 percent annually, but productivity decreased by 0.58 percent 
annually (Yadav, 19877). The stagnation of grain production in the plain (Terai) 
triggered an economic crisis in Nepal, which led to a huge gap between production 
and supply of total food grains (Seddon, 1994), because, during 1980s, agriculture 
was still one of the significant contributors of the GDP. The World Bank (1991) 
viewed that the agricultural land base is approaching the saturation point, but the 
scope for increasing productivity still exists. The Bank concluded that poor 
economic performance and rapid population growth are the leading factors for the 
poverty of Nepal. Many governments, i.e., governments formed before 1990 and 
after 1990, attempted to redistribute the land in order to reduce the landless induced 
poverty as perceived and failed miserably. In the words of an eminent economist, 
Kenneth Boulding (1968), “Abolition of poverty can only come from development, 
not from redistribution, not taking from the rich to give to poor, but by making 
everybody richer.” 
 
F o r e s t  R e s o u r c e s  
 
Green forests were the wealth of rulers and administrators in Nepal. Before 1950, it 
was believed that the total natural stock of trees covered more than two thirds of 
the country. After a civilian revolution in 1950, forests in Nepal underwent 
successive ownership changes. In 1956, forests in Nepal were nationalized by the 
government, which tried to protect them from being “the tragedy of commons”. 
However, in 1961 after the King introduced his political system, State monopoly 
over the forest resources were attempted several times under different names and 
isolated people’s role on forest conservation and management. For example, the 
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rulers cleared an undeclared amount of forest area and diverted the money to 
political gains in the general referendum of 1979. The government was involved in 
clearing forest areas and settling people from different parts of the country. Despite 
total state control over forest areas, the government failed to effectively manage 
forest areas. Massive deforestation began in the 1950s with the gradual collapse of 
the feudal forest management system (Gilmour, and Fisher, 1991). Ives and 
Messerli (2001) accounted the history and dynamics of deforestation in Nepal. 
They observed that 50 percent of Nepal’s forest cover has been lost in thirty years. 
Furthermore, additional causes of forest depletion in Nepal were fuel wood 
collection from forests, grazing, illegal logging, and marginal expansion of 
agriculture areas by slash and burn activities (Ministry of Population and 
Environment, 2001). A recent national forest inventory of Nepal, which began in 
1990 and ended in 1998, provided the first countrywide forest inventory since the 
1960s. The Department of Forest Research and Survey in 1999 estimated that in 
Nepal, forest covers about 4.27 million hectares (29%) and shrub covers 1.56 
million hectares (10.6%) of a total land area of 14.72 million hectares (Härkönen, 
2002). 
 Forest management became one of the main concerns after the political change 
in 1990. As government realized in the Forest Sector Master Plan that local 
people’s involvement is necessary in order to save and to manage local forest 
resources, people oriented Forest Acts and Rules were promulgated in early 
nineties. The Forest Act-1992 and the Forest Regulations-1994 embraced the 
dynamics of local people and forest resources through the community forestry. 
‘Community forestry refers to the situation where forests are controlled and 
managed as the common property by groups of rural people who agree to use them 
to support their farms and households’ (Jackson, and Ingles, 1995). Acharya (2002) 
reviewed the prospects of community forestry in Nepal which serves a pioneer 
model of natural resource management. Nepal is a leader in engaging community 
for protection and management of forest (World Bank, 2001).  The government of 
Nepal aims to hand over about 3.5 million hectares (about 61 percent of total forest 
area) of forest areas to FUGs. The Community Forestry Division at the Department 
of Forest estimated that at the end of December 2002, there were 12,079 FUGs and 
about 955,358 hectares of forest handed over. The total beneficiaries were about 
1.34 million people. There are about 556 FUGs are exclusively managed by 
women. FUGs are trying to reverse a phenomenon of the tragedy of commons 
based on their social structures and values. Local people are building up their social 
capital in order to enhance the natural capital through mutual cooperation. People 
in different regions are experiencing the resilience of the local ecosystem over a 
period of one decade. Local people not only are taking the “interest” from the 
forest, i.e., fuel wood, food and timber, depending upon the harvest rate, but also 
are committed to increasing the forest stock – a capital enhancement. The FUG of 
Nepal is a successful model of resource management, and provides a conclusive 
example of strong sustainability (Devkota, 2005). 
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B A R R I E R S  O F  D E V E L O P M E N T  I N  N E P A L  
 
In spite of few positive economic indicators of past decade(s), Nepal is still in the 
web of a vicious cycle of poverty and a low level of social, economic, and political 
development. The crises are intertwined with politico-economics, and means and 
ends of governance. Different estimates indicate that majority of the population of 
Nepal is struggling with absolute poverty (Kievelitz, Ojha, and Sharma, 1998) 
though HMGN claims it has reduced the absolute poverty level to 38 percent. The 
persistent poverty is a single but a significant indicator failure of socioeconomic 
development goal mentioned in different planning documents. All stakeholders of 
development such as politicians, planners, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, and donors 
were ineffective to arrest the feedback loops of poverty (Figure 2). A poverty 
stricken family is deprived of sufficient resource endowments like agricultural 
land, education, and skills to sustain the family. These make it difficult to earn a 
daily wage and to feed the family. As the family grows, all members are 
encouraged to earn by selling their physical labor power. School attending children 
have to drop out from school in order to support the family. The lack of education 
or skill is another source of a poverty loop for the next generation, and that may 
continue.  
 
Figure 2. A Typical Feedback-Loop for a Poverty-Stricken Family 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nepal is a victim of under-development and poor policies (Meier, 2001). When 
policies and governing institutions are incompatible development may fail. This is 
evident in Nepal, where development suffers despite the positive economic growth 
statistics in the recent decade. Some major tribulations hindering socioeconomic 
development in Nepal are: 
Family without adequate
resources, education and
skill
Depends daily wages
for survival
Family members are
compelled to earn
Increases the school
dropout of kids
Can't afford school,
health, and other basic
needs
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C o r r u p t i o n  a n d  L a c k  o f  F i n a n c i a l  D i s c i p l i n e  
 
Corruption affects different aspects of development such as the level of investment, 
property rights regime, income distribution, access to resources, and assets within 
the country (Jain, 2001). Corruption in Nepal spreads from different executive 
levels to primary units of political, bureaucratic, and legislative bodies. The 2004 
annual report of the Amnesty International ranks Nepal as one of the corrupted 
countries in the world. Mieko Nishimizu4 the World Bank’s Vice President for the 
South Asia region, explicitly stated, “Nepal has a serious crisis of governance, and 
high level of corruption”. Take another example: the 2001 annual report of the 
Auditor General mentions that Nepal’s total unaccounted expenses reached Rs. 
38.42 billion (1 USD = Rs. 75), which is about 40 percent of the 2001 GDP. 
Although all unaccounted expenses may not represent corruption, it indicates a lack 
of fiscal discipline at different levels in the State. Politico-bureaucratic dishonesty 
is injecting a negative feeling to the people. The responsible authority to maintain 
fiscal discipline is either the minister or the secretary or both. Since there are a 
number of corruption cases filed against many former ministers and bureaucrats, a 
motley relation between or among different money laundering stakeholders cannot 
be ignored. 
 
D o n o r  d r i v e n  i n i t i a t i o n  
 
Nepal prides herself for not being a politically colonized state since the historic 
period, but this image is tarnished by economic dependency. After Nepal became a 
member of The Colombo Plan (Benham, 1954), a gateway opened for foreign 
financial and technical assistance. Since 1950s Nepal’s dependency upon foreign 
aid has been unnecessarily huge. It is estimated that the total foreign loans drawn 
by the country reached Rs. 194.37 billion in 2001. Even today, two thirds of the 
annual budget is supported by foreign donations.  On the other hand, out of the 
gross domestic product of $ 5.5 billion about $ 1.7 billion is the present value of 
debt. The amount of per capita debt owed has reached $14.70 (World Bank, 2001).  
Further, there is not a complete record of the foreign money flow in the country. "It 
is a serious matter that there are no records of how much aid and loans are brought 
into the country. We have repeatedly demanded with the government to come up 
with a mechanism to keep track of these amounts to avoid irregularities and misuse 
of funds but this has not happened"5. The Auditor General’s Annual Report-2001 
mentions that the trend of misuse of foreign aid and loans is on the rise. There is no 
data of how the devaluation of the Nepalese rupee against the dollars has added to 
the burden. The report further says that the devaluation of the currency has 
increased the loan burden by an additional 10.4 percent just in 2000. Additionally 
                                                 
4 Nishimizu, Mieko quoted in The Kathmandu Post, <www.kantipuronline.com> 
(September 11, 2002). 
5 Auditor General quoted in The Kathmandu Post <www.kantipuronline.com> (October 01, 
2001). 
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donors are able to bypass the government and initiate projects or programs of their 
own. 
 Foreign aid, though unavoidable, rather than enhancing the productivity in 
Nepal, became an economic burden due to unsustainability of the projects 
(Schwartz, and Paulhare, 2000). Foreign aid has destroyed the indigenous 
economic system such as local knowledge and cooperative spirit – a form of social 
capital that were sustainable, though may not be modern (Shrestha, 1993; Mihaly, 
1965). One of the major augments for foreign aid is that it has enhanced the level 
of investment in Nepal because the country had a very low domestic saving rate 
(Pant, 1991). Although foreign aid to Nepal is being streamlined through the Nepal 
Aid Group – a World Bank aegis, in general, HMGN is still lagging behind in its 
effort to use aid resources efficiently in terms of needs and capacity. 
 
H u m a n  c a p i t a l  a n d  l o w  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
 
One of the impediments to economic growth and development in Nepal is low 
productivity rather than a paucity of resources (Shah, 1988). For instance, The 
Labor Force Survey reveals a general outlook of work force quality such as nearly 
6.8 million have never attended school, and approximately 4 million people never 
completed high school (CBS, 1999). These figures imply a very poor status of 
human skill and capital of majority of the population. As discussed earlier, 
agricultural sector productivity growth has been more or less stagnant in the last 
five decades, and other economic sectors were unable to absorb a significant 
fraction of the work force. Entrepreneurs at the national level were not capable of 
absorbing the growing number of unemployed people, which may be due to lack of 
capital or skills. Since economic opportunity in the rural areas is very limited, the 
so-called economically active population is increasingly interested in working in 
foreign countries. Nepalese labor forces are spreading over the East, Southeast, 
South and West Asia in search of jobs. The exact figure and character of such labor 
forces working outside the country is not available, but the guess estimation is 
about one million people are distributed throughout the world. The remittance 
money sent by these labor forces is the main sources of monetary flow in the 
country. For instance, for the year of 1999 it is estimated on social accounting 
matrices (discussed below) that about one billion dollar of remittance money was 
sent by people working or living outside the country, and that amount is more or 
less equal to the fiscal budget of the government. Subsequently, the latest National 
Living Standard Survey of 2004 (CBS, 2005) claims that absolute poverty level is 
decreased around 30 percent of population in spite of political instability and slow 
economic growth. One of the primary factors behind this poverty scenario is 
believed due to the injection of remittance cash in household economic activities 
which is about 32 percent of household. The same survey also confirms that about 
30 of population earn less seven dollars per month, and the gap between the rich 
and poor is increased. 
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N e g l e c t  o f  V i l l a g e s  
 
Although HMGN spent five decades of development planning at the village 
development committee (VDC) level basic socioeconomic development structures 
such as primary health care center, post office, telephone, technical advisers for 
agriculture, and proper infrastructure facilities are still lacking. Take a simple 
example of the health post, which are public institutes, and run by only paramedics 
in rural areas. As of 2000, there were altogether 711 health posts in the country 
where 3914 VDCs exist (Ministry of Finance, 2001). Ironically, HMGN stopped to 
produce paramedics in late 1970s and restarted in late 1990s. On the other hand, 
population stabilization has been a primary planning objective of HMGN since 
1970s. Based on population census information it can be inferred that during the 
past five decades the average population growth rate decreased from 2.3 (1951/52) 
to 2.27 (2001), which also indicates that the annual population stabilization efforts 
had insignificant impact despite spent of billions, if not trillions of Rupees. 
Population spurred since seventies, and the Sixth Five-year Plan of Nepal (1980-
85) aimed to reduce population growth rate to 1.6 percent in 1990, and 1.2 percent 
in the year of 2000. The Seventh Five-year Plan (1985-90) reiterated the same 
objective of population stabilization. Further, at the end of the Ninth Five-year Plan 
(1997-2002), population growth rate was still above 2 percent. By these account, it 
can be inferred that the Plans never achieved their goal. One of the reasons failing 
to meet the goal could be lack of politico-economic development structures at the 
VDCs. Had population stabilization activities were complemented by setting up a 
health post in each VDC, it would have achieved different scenarios. The local 
needs and center’s contribution is in opposite direction. The situation is like 
juxtaposing two pyramids of flows of problems and resources (Box). Norberg-
Hodge (1992) observed a similar centralized development experience in the nearby 
region of Ladakh, which also became of victim the modernization paradigm that 
led to the disruption and degradation of self – reliant local economies.  Earlier Haq 
(1976) also discussed the sins of a centralized developing planning in Pakistan that 
failed to address the poor community in the country; a situation is similar to Nepal. 
Haq also concluded that both mixed economy and the generous assistance of 
developed countries to upgrade the living standard and growth were inappropriate 
models of development.  
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Box.  Top-Down Flow of Resources and Bottom-Up Flow of Problems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E m e r g e n c e  o f  M a o i s t  I n s u r g e n c e  
 
Since February 1996 the country has been turned into a sociopolitical battlefield 
because of surfacing of a certain violent breed of communist, Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist). Theoretically, it follows Mao Zedong’s political philosophy and 
has an ambition of transforming the Nepali society through the ‘people’s war’. 
Different perspectives of the Maoists insurgence in Nepal are discussed by Hutt 
(2004). The rationale of the ‘people’s war’ is to fulfill its 40 point demands which 
basically include socioeconomic development issues, and change of state’s political 
system. Maoists strategically selected the villages as their bases that are disused by 
the politicians, rulers and administrators over the period of time. Gersony (2003) 
discusses some typical characters of the villages where Maoists began their 
struggle. The socioeconomic demands of the Maoists are not new but laudable. 
However, its activities to accomplish such goals are brutal, and condemnable. 
Many of these socioeconomic issues, in fact, were raised by different political 
parties at different time periods such as political movements against Panchayat and 
at least in their election manifestos. Once elected or gained any high level 
positions, such subject matters were disregarded by major parties. Maoists are 
exploiting that sort of election politics of seasoned political parties. One of the 
leaders of the Maoists in Nepal, Baburam Bhattarai (2003) concludes, “The 
problems of development / underdevelopment of Nepal both in the social and 
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spatial dimensions are essentially the problem of transition of a pre-capitalist 
society hybridized primarily under the retrograde internal social structure but 
increasingly mediated by the exogenous capitalist/ imperialist interest.” It also 
implies that Nepal may need of an overhauling of politico-economic structure in 
order to build a new Nepal, since Maoists are crippling the economic activities, 
creating political instability, displacing people from their home areas, and 
operating their own shadow administrative unit in many rural areas. 
Further, after King Gyanendra ascended the throne on June 2001 after a 
controversial royal massacre of June 1 2001, many political developments have 
happened. For instance, the King gave permission to mobilize army to crush the 
Maoists. The Royal Nepalese Army under the command and control of the King 
came out in November 2001 to enforce emergency. The objective of mobilization 
of the army seemed dubious. Further involvement of the army and continuation of 
emergency became a hot political issue that ended by dissolving the parliament. 
Subsequently, on October 4, 2002, the King sacked the prime minister and 
dissolved the parliament. In absence of a parliament, the King’s active involvement 
in day-to-day politics indicates a tendency towards absolute monarchy, but the 
existing Constitution does not support a vacuum of parliament in Nepal.  
 
 
S T R U C T U R A L  A N A L Y S I S  O F  T H E  N E P A L E S E  E C O N O M Y  
 
Structural analysis of economic development has been widely used as a 
development tool in less- developed countries like Nepal. Though the causes and 
effects of poverty are understood in different Plan documents, there is a persistent 
disparity of income or and consumption. Following the philosophy of 
modernization, the government of Nepal is determined to increase the rate of 
economic growth so that the poor will benefit as directly as possible from 
economic development. To promote the growth agenda, a variety of strategies, 
polices, plans and programs were put forward, but outputs were at dismal in real 
terms such as population stabilization. What is the difference between the new plan 
and old versions, since both new and old Plans also had the same goals of 
socioeconomic development? Hence, it is imperative to examine the 
socioeconomic structure of the nation that portrays the interrelationships among 
economic, social, environmental, demographic, and technological contexts of a 
particular society. Structural analysis characterizes the economy at a meso-level 
and uses the models of input-output analysis and social accounting matrix (SAM) 
(Duchin, 1998). Structurally, a SAM is a transparent transaction of a 
socioeconomic system (Thorbecke, 1998) to describe the factors of production, 
economic behavior of household income, and consumption, government 
expenditures, imports, exports and foreign investments (Pyatt, 1991). The SAM 
approach has been widely used in developing countries since 1970s (Round, 2003). 
Recently, a SAM is employed to derive a multiplier decomposition procedure 
focusing on poverty alleviation in Indonesia (Thorbecke and Jung, 1996), South 
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Africa (Khan, 1999), and a structural analysis of the Vietnamese economy (Tarp, 
Ronald-Holst, and Rand, 2003). 
A summarized output of 26 x 26 sectors SAM for the year of 1999 is depicted 
in Table 2 (Devkota, 2003). As table 2 shows agriculture has the lowest (1.769), 
and the construction sector has the highest income multiplier effects (1.908). 
Interestingly, banking and real estate have the lowest output impact (2.201) 
compared to all other production sectors. Both construction and manufacturing 
industries are the leading sectors having high output multipliers. Agriculture 
sectors’ aggregate income multiplier (1.769) and output multiplier (2.294) are 
smaller than those found in Korea, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. The 
multipliers for the Nepali economy are comparable with those of an African 
country. Similarly, the average income multiplier (1.801) and output multiplier 
(2.458) is more or less equal with Kenya, Surinam, and Egypt, but less than India 
(income = 3.684; output = 5.946), Pakistan (income = 4.028; output = 8.770), Sri 
Lanka (income = 2.055; output =3.090), and Indonesia (income = 2.119; output = 
3.390) (Cohen, 2002).  It might be noticed that the output multipliers for Nepal are 
relatively homogeneous. Cohen also found a homogeneous pattern of output 
multipliers in the less developed countries he studied.   
 Economic growth is also a function of investment that obviously will have 
multiplier effects, but there are a few noteworthy considerations. As discussed in 
earlier, there are certain barriers to socioeconomic development such as two-thirds 
of Nepal’s annual budget is supported by the kindness of donors or by different 
types of loans, which may or may not be available as expected to meet the targeted 
level of investment. Another fundamental problem is whether the increased 
nominal income level will alleviate poverty in real terms. Economic factor like 
change in the price level always pose problems to low-income households. It is 
expected that from 2000 to 2007 the GDP deflator will rise by 76 percent, which 
will obviously impact investment since from 1995/1996 to 1999/2000 the national 
average inflation rate was 35 percent. These facts will obviously set back real 
income growth, particularly for poor and low-income families.  
 There are additional factors that may hamper the investment induced income 
multiplier scenarios.  For instance, investment in agriculture demands a high 
priority due to the fact that 90 percent of the people depend on agriculture, and it 
contributes 40 percent of GDP. The Labor Force Survey of 1998/1999 estimated 
that out of 9.5 million employed people, the agriculture sector employs 6.4 million 
people. The problem is further complicated by households’ land holding capacity. 
The average land hold size in 1991/1992 was 0.68 hectare in mountain, areas 0.77 
in hills, and 1.26 hectare in the Terai. About 70 percent of the landholdings are less 
than one ha, and agricultural productivity has been stagnant for decades. The total 
cultivated land in the country is 2.6 million hectares, and 30 per cent of the 
cultivated area is comprised of farms less than 1 ha. The recent Population Census 
2001 reveals about 24.4 percent of population does not have any land. The 
prevailing land holding pattern means no or low possibility for income generating 
chances for poor households. The cumulative impacts of such factors may reduce 
the investment-income multipliers, and may increase income disparity.  
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Table 2.  SAM Multipliers by Production Sectors 
 
 Agriculture Manuf. Ind. Construction Gas Water Electricity 
Trade Hotel 
Resturant 
Transport 
Communication 
Banking 
Real Estate 
Community, 
Social Serv. 
Food   0.450351752 0.45296453 0.485599954 0.4516548 0.453645382 0.452485608 0.454960073 0.465799951 
Non-food 0.214864063 0.21611063 0.231681078 0.215485751 0.216435463 0.215882132 0.217062706 0.222234442 
Housing/Others 0.078569154 0.07902498 0.084718617 0.078796486 0.079143766 0.07894143 0.079373129 0.081264274 
Factors 1.769721905 1.77998918 1.908234779 1.774842418 1.782664696 1.778107199 1.787830963 1.830427821 
          
1st Deciles HH* 0.029525077 0.02969637 0.031835951 0.029610505 0.029741008 0.029664973 0.029827199 0.030537862 
2nd Deciles HH 0.03857906 0.03880288 0.041598572 0.038690685 0.038861207 0.038761855 0.038973829 0.039902419 
3rd Deciles HH 0.045292367 0.04555514 0.048837317 0.045423416 0.045623611 0.045506971 0.04575583 0.046846009 
4th Deciles HH 0.052073031 0.05237514 0.056148691 0.052223699 0.052453865 0.052319763 0.052605879 0.053859267 
5th Deciles HH 0.059190483 0.05953388 0.063823213 0.059361745 0.05962337 0.059470939 0.059796162 0.061220865 
6th Deciles HH 0.067279007 0.06766933 0.072544811 0.067473672 0.067771049 0.067597788 0.067967454 0.069586846 
7th Deciles HH 0.077118828 0.07756624 0.083154777 0.077341964 0.077682834 0.077484233 0.077907963 0.079764198 
8th Deciles HH 0.090231106 0.09075459 0.097293328 0.090492181 0.090891008 0.090658639 0.091154415 0.09332626 
9th Deciles HH 0.110011785 0.11065003 0.118622205 0.110330093 0.110816352 0.110533043 0.111137504 0.113785466 
10th Deciles HH 0.174484226 0.17549652 0.188140785 0.174989078 0.175760309 0.175310967 0.176269673 0.180469474 
Firms 1.025936936 1.03188904 1.10623513 1.028905382 1.033440085 1.030798029 1.036435055 1.061129155 
         
Total income 
multiplier 1.769721905 1.77998918 1.908234779 1.774842418 1.782664696 1.778107199 1.787830963 1.830427821 
         
Agriculture  1.42295374 0.5763816 0.445428144 0.367984692 0.372761509 0.36815245 0.372234113 0.392247469 
Manufacturing 
industries 0.311779613 1.40846758 0.528998287 0.280610686 0.277928532 0.275207013 0.288674904 0.355855711 
Construction 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Gas Electricity 
Water 0.010815996 0.02155681 0.014118462 1.026796707 0.016646915 0.012966103 0.012595016 0.014447941 
Trade Hotel 
Restaurant 0.164155548 0.22633462 0.222240089 0.15476546 1.239840762 0.314552756 0.161938663 0.205025918 
Transport 
Communication 0.173214536 0.25843783 0.237470796 0.156874215 0.23152787 1.259120847 0.159864175 0.220929061 
Banking Real 
Estate 0.185343476 0.22619835 0.206335072 0.292573133 0.201171866 0.292337215 1.169361716 0.176552641 
Community 
Social Service 0.025936936 0.03188904 0.10623513 0.028905382 0.033440085 0.030798029 0.036435055 1.061129155 
         
Total output 
multiplier 2.294199844 2.74926582 2.760825979 2.308510275 2.373317539 2.553134414 2.201103641 2.426187895 
 
 
* household 
       
 
 
 
   SURENDRA R. DEVKOTA 
 
19 
Government initiated land reform measures in the past did not deliver any 
significant results. 
 One of the viable options is effective mobilization of human capital which has 
low endowment due to poor education vis-à-vis skills. As the SAM coefficients 
justify, investment in household sectors have high multiplier values, and thus it is 
imperative to intervene at household level to enhance human and social capital. To 
this end, improving community and social services could benefit at least the 1st, 2nd 
and 3rd deciles households that may include socioeconomically discriminated 
households like Dalits. Poverty alleviation programs should exclusively target 
these households to enrich their human skill and education as well as quality of 
life, and break the vicious cycle of poverty. Thorbecke and Jung (1996) used a 
SAM multiplier decomposition method to analyze poverty in Indonesia, and 
concluded that, “human capital of the poor must be enhanced through education 
and vocational training”. They observed that the agriculture and service sectors 
contribute more to overall poverty alleviation than do industrial sectors. Both 
economic growth and increasing the capital stock of the poor by appropriate skill 
enhancement may help to alleviate poverty. HMGN needs an urgent coherent 
national strategy to utilize human resources in order to alleviate poverty. Had either 
government or donor communities spent their efforts to enhance the skill of human 
resources at village level, resources would have been used in productive and 
beneficial ways. Though human capital depends up on the education and skill, 
unfortunately, the general education system in Nepal is anti-development and the 
educated masses in Nepal are just as loathe to working physically and productively 
(Bista, 1994). The greatest challenge for the HMGN is the provision of 
occupational training for national self-sufficiency that in turn can help to alleviate 
unemployment (Skar, and Cederroth, 1997) 
 
 
C O N C L U S I O N  
 
The past fifty years of economic development policies in Nepal, which tried to 
transform the traditional society through modernization models, is lagging behind 
to arrest the poverty level. Economic development polices in Nepal have been 
dominated by the modernization paradigm emphasizing economic growth, 
industrialization, and urbanization, and as a result Nepal today has some salient 
characteristics:  
 
(i) It is one of the poorest countries in the world.  
(ii) It has one of highest per capita debt in the world.  
(iii) It is dependent upon outside donors for nearly two thirds of its annual 
fiscal budget.  
(iv) Majority of population struggles to meet basic needs.  
(v) Huge disparities exist between rich and poor families.  
(vi) It has a long history of failed attempts of land reforms.  
(vii) Its agricultural productivity is stagnant for many decades.  
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(viii) Government’s policy failure induced loss of natural resources.  
(ix) A huge regionally biased economic growth induced for regional 
migration. 
(x) Cities sprouted without any proper planning and turned into the hub of 
the environmental problems.  
 
Nepal’s unrelenting poverty indicates a failure of central level planning exercises. 
The structural analysis explored some of the macroeconomic relationships and 
found some serious contradictions between the stated goals of the plan and the 
feasibility of achieving those goals. Among the production activities, the 
agriculture sector has the lowest income coefficients where as community and 
social services, and construction activities have high total income multipliers. 
Regarding the output coefficients, the banking sector has the lowest, and industries 
and construction activities have high aggregate output multipliers. The Tenth Plan 
envisions a huge investment so that the standard of living of the poor may be 
raised. Investment in the community and social sectors will deliver a high output 
due to these sectors’ high multiplier values. The investment – income multiplier 
scenarios indicate that the income level of households may increase during the Plan 
period, keeping many factors mute such as bad governance, high corruption, 
increasing inflation, and ill-defined sources of investment funding.  
 Nepal needs a new development strategy to alleviate poverty. Socioeconomic 
development philosophy and policies including institutional reforms are necessary 
to alleviate rural poverty. In spite of few positive indicators of economic growth, 
development in general has yet to satisfy the large masses of people, who are 
struggling with stagnant agricultural yields, increasing numbers of hungry people, 
and widening income disparity. For example, it would have been a good initiation 
of pro-poor socioeconomic development policy had HMGN built at least one 
health post in each VDC in order to provide the services for population 
stabilization. Villages have been relegated to the bottom in terms of availability of 
economic structures, development institutions as well as resources where the crux 
of problems exists. This needs to be reversed in order to sustain the village 
economy and to reduce the level of poverty. Therefore in order to break the vicious 
cycle of poverty vis-à-vis under-development, each VDC should be assigned as a 
socioeconomic development unit. To complement the VDCs, a district unit can 
play a developmental planning and monitoring role. The village and district are 
politico-administrative units, which have to deal with lots of socioeconomic 
problems (Box), but have an insignificant resources and rights. Institutional 
reforms to strengthen the VDCs and district units are essential so that they will be 
complemented by both economic and development planning, and implementation 
facilities. Decentralization should focus on the VDCs that meets local needs as 
much as possible. To this regard, local bodies (villages and districts) must be 
empowered through a coherent policy of accountability, institutional and financial 
decentralization, ecological and economical rights along with civil liberties. Once 
VDCs are ensured through basic socioeconomic developmental structures like 
health clinics, basic education, technical assistance to farmers, local community 
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infrastructure, and conservation programs, local communities would become 
sustainable with reduced income disparity. Institutional arrangements are the 
necessary foundations for vibrant economic systems, poverty alleviation and 
sustainable development cannot take place without them (Bromley, 1998).  To 
break the vicious cycle of poverty, at least the 1st, 2nd and 3rd deciles households 
that may include socioeconomically discriminated households should exclusively 
target to enrich their human capital such as vocational or semi-skilled professional 
education. 
 Nepal is struggling to meet basic human needs such as an adequate supply of 
food, water, healthcare, shelter, and minimum education; all of which needs to be 
sustained economically, environmentally, and socially. Human needs are not 
limited to simply consumption and saving, which may be short-term gains or goals. 
The conventional vision of economic growth through trickle down economics - a 
weak sustainability model has not improved the economic situation of majority of 
the Nepalese. Repetition of successive five-year development plans would be 
futile, since these plans are failed at local level. Planners and policy makers should 
realize that the least developed countries like Nepal do not need to follow a similar 
route of development adopted by the developed countries. They need to be 
compatible with local socioeconomic structure. Poor countries need to revise 
planning and policy models in the context of their own socioeconomic structure, 
value systems, and cultures. Henceforth, development plans, policies, and 
programs should emphasize other pillars of development such as social and 
ecological capital.  As sustainability cannot be achieved in parts it should address 
the entire structure – economy, society, and ecology. HMGN should plan to meet 
economic growth that complemented by social and ecological capital development 
– a form of strong sustainability that may involve structural changes within the 
economy and society. Augmentation of social capital is possible by enriching 
human capital, particularly focusing on the deprived classes of society who will 
ultimately determine the future of sustainability. Nepal could pursue a long term 
sustainability path through increased human capital without increasing material 
throughput, supporting increased equality, and maintaining the stock of natural 
capital for the future – en route to strong sustainability. To address such issues at 
local level, Nepal may need a progressive constitution to speed up socioeconomic 
development vis-à-vis alleviate poverty. A new constitution that guarantees 
sociopolitical, economic and ecological rights to local government units like 
villages, towns, and districts, which must be constitutionally empowered with 
rights, resources, and responsibility, and accountability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   SURENDRA R. DEVKOTA 
 
22 
 
R E F E R E N C E S  
 
Acharya, K.P. 2002. “Twenty Four Years of Community Forestry in Nepal,” 
International Forestry Review. 4 (2): 149-156. 
Adhikari, R. 1988. Manufacturing Industries in Developing Countries: An 
Economic Efficiency Analysis of Nepal. Avebury: Gower Publishing Company. 
Apter, D. E. 1987. Rethinking Development: Modernization, Dependency, and 
Postmodern Politics. California: Sage Publications. 
Benham, F. 1954. “The Colombo Plan,” Economica, 21: 93-112. 
Bhattarai, B.R. 2003. The Nature of Underdevelopment and Regional Structure of 
Nepal: A Marxist Analysis. Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 
Bista, D. B. 1994. Fatalism and Development. Calcutta: Orient Longman. 
Blaikie P.M., J. Cameron, and J. Seddon.2001. Nepal in Crisis: Growth and 
Stagnation at the Periphery. Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 
Boulding, K. 1968. Beyond Economics. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press, 1968. 
Bromley, D. W. 1998. “Searching for sustainability: The poverty of spontaneous 
order,” Ecological Economics. 24: 231-240. 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 1996. Nepal Living Standards Survey. 
Kathmandu: CBS.   
Central Bureau of Statistics. 1999. Nepal Labor Force Survey, Kathmandu: CBS. 
Central Bureau of Statistics. 2001. Population Census 2001, Kathmandu: CBS.. 
Central Bureau of Statistics. 2005. National Living Standard Survey: Preliminary 
Findings, Kathmandu,: CBS. 
Chitrakar, R. and J. Weiss. 1995.“Foreign Investment in Nepal in The 1980s: A 
Cost Benefit Evaluation,” The Journal of Development Studies, 31: 51-463. 
Cohen, S. I. 2002. Social Accounting and Economic Modeling for Developing 
Countries: Analysis, Policy and Planning Application. (Burlington: Ashgate. 
Devkota, S. R. 2005. “Whether strong sustainability is operational? An example 
from Nepal,” forthcoming in Sustainable Development.  
Devkota, S. R. 2003. Strong sustainability in Nepal: a structural economics 
approach, Ph.D. Dissertation (Unpublished), Department of Economics, New 
York: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.   
Domar, E. 1946. “Capital expansion, rate of growth, and employment,” 
Econometrica 14:137-147.  
Duchin, F. 1998. Structural Economics. Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
Gersony, R. 2003. Sowing the wind: History and Dynamics of the Maoist Revolt in 
Nepal’s Rapti Hills, Report Submitted to Mercy Corps International, October 
2003. <www.mercycorps.org> 
Ghimire, K. 1992. Forest or Farm: The Politics of Poverty and Land Hunger in 
Nepal. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Gilmour, D. A. and R. J. Fisher. 1991. Villagers, Forests and Foresters. 
Kathmandu: Sahayogi Press. 
Hagen, T. 1971. ‘Nepal’. Berne: Kummerly & Frey.  
   SURENDRA R. DEVKOTA 
 
23 
Haq, M. Ul.  1976. The Poverty Curtain: Choices for The Third World. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Härkönen, E. 2002. “1999 Inventory of Nepal's Forest Resources,” Mountain 
Research and Development, 22: 85-87. 
Harrod, R. 1939. “An Essay in Dynamic Theory,” Economic Journal, 49:14-35. 
Hutt, M. 2004. Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press.  
Ives, J. D. and B. Messerli. 2001. The Himalayan Dilemma: Reconciling 
Development and Conservation. New York: Routledge.  
Jackson, W. J. and A. W., Ingles. 1995. “Developing Rural Communities and 
Conserving The Biodiversity Of Nepal’s Forests Through Community 
Forestry,” In Proceedings of a Seminar on Community Development and 
Conservation of Forest Biodiversity through Community Forestry, October 26-
28, 1994, RECOFTC Report No. 12, Bangkok, (1995). 
Jain, A.K. 2001. “Corruption: a Review,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 15: 72-
107. 
K.C, Ram B. 1986. Land Reform Progress and Prospectus in Nepal, Research 
Report Series No. 2, HMG/ USAID /GTZ / Winrock Project, Kathmandu. 
Karan, P. P., and H. Ishii. 1996. Nepal: A Himalayan Kingdom in Transition. 
Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 
Khadka, N. 1994. “Politics and the Economy during Nepal’s Party-less Panchayat 
System (1961-1990): A Study in Retrospect,” Asian Affairs. 25: 47-59. 
Khan, H.A. 1999. “Sectoral Growth and Poverty Alleviation: A Multiplier 
Decomposition Technique Applied to South Africa,” World Development. 27: 
521-30. 
Kievelitz, U, D. P. Ojha and S. Sharma. 1998. “The Nepalese Poverty Alleviation 
Issues and The Gtz Strategy,” Discussion Paper, Impact Monitoring Unit, 
Kathmandu: German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). 
Kirkpatrick, W. J. 1986. An Account of Kingdom of Nepal. New Delhi: Manjusri 
Ltd., (Reprint)  
Koirala, G.P. and R. K. Koshal. 1999. Productivity and Technology In Nepal: An 
Analysis of Foreign And Domestic Firms”, Journal of Asian Economics. 10: 
605-618. 
Ladejinsky, W. 1977. Too Late to Save Asia, In L. J. Walinsky, (Editor) The 
Selected Papers Of Wolf Ladejinsky Agrarian Reform as Unfinished Business. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
MacFarlane, A. 1994. Fatalism and Development in Nepal. In Michael Hutt 
(Editor), Nepal In The Nineties: Versions of The Past, Visions of The Future, 
Bombay: Oxford University Press. 
Meier, G. M. 2001. “The Old Generation of Development Economists and The 
New,” In Meier, G. M. and J. E. Stiglitz (Editors) Frontiers of Development 
Economists: The Future Perspectives. Washington D.C.: Oxford University 
Press. 
Mihaly, E.B. 1965. Foreign Aid and Politics in Nepal: A Case Study. London: 
Oxford University Press. 
   SURENDRA R. DEVKOTA 
 
24 
Ministry of Finance. 2001. Economic Survey 2000/01. Kathmandu: MOF. 
Ministry of Population and Environment. 2001. Nepal: State of Environment 2001. 
Kathmandu: MOPE/UNEP/ICIMOD/NORAD/SACEP. 
National Planning Commission. 1992, and 1997. 8th and 9th Plans of Nepal. 
Kathmandu: NPC. 
Norberg–Hodge, H. 1992. Ancient Futures: Learning from Ladakh. San Francisco: 
Sierra Club Books. 
Ojha, E.R. 1997. “Regional Development and Disparity in The Context of Overall 
Development: Special References to Nepal,” Regional Development Studies. 3: 
26-56. 
Pandey, D. R. 1999. Nepal’s Failed Development: Reflections on The Mission and 
The Maladies. Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Center. 
Pant, G.P. 1991.  Foreign Aid, Economic Growth and Social Cost Benefit Analysis. 
Avebury: Academic Publishing Group. 
Pyatt, G. 1991.“Fundamentals of Social Accounting,” Economic Systems Research, 
3: 315-342. 
Regmi, M.C. 1962. “Recent Land Reform Programs in Nepal,” Asian Survey, 17: 
32-37. 
Regmi, M.C. 1971. A Study in Nepali Economic History 1768-1846. New Delhi: 
Manjushree Publishing House.  
Regmi, M.C. 1977. Land Ownership in Nepal. Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 
Rose, L. 1971. Nepal: Strategy for Survival. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Round, J. 2003. “Social Accounting Matrices and SAM Based Multiplier 
Analysis,” In F. Bourguignon and L. A. P. da Silva (Editors), The Impact of 
Economic Policies on Poverty and Income Distribution. Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank and Oxford University Press.  
Schwartz, M., and A.P. Paulhare. 2000. Foreign Experts and Unsustainable 
Development: Transferring Israeli Technology to Zambia, Nigeria and Nepal. 
Aldershot: Ashgate.   
Seddon, D. 1994. “Democracy and Development in Nepal,” In Michael Hutt 
(Editor), Nepal in The Nineties: Versions of The Past, Visions of The Future. 
Bombay: Oxford University Press. 
Shah, S. 1988. “Nepal’s Economic Development: Problems and Prospectus,” Asian 
Survey. XXVIII: 945-957. 
Sharma, K. et al. 2001. “Liberalization, Export Incentive, and Trade Intensity: New 
Evidence From Nepalese Manufacturing Industries,” Journal of Asian 
Economies. 12: 123-135. 
Shrestha, N. R. 1993. “Enchanted by The Mantra of Bikas: A Self-Respective 
Perspective on Nepalese Elites and Development,” South Asia Bulletin. XIII: 5-
22. 
Shrestha, N. R. 2001. The Political Economy of Land, Landless and Migration in 
Nepal. New Delhi: Nirala Publications. 
Skar, H.O., and S. Cederroth. 1997. ‘Development aid to Nepal’ Nordic Institute of 
Asian Studies, Report no 35. Curzon.    
   SURENDRA R. DEVKOTA 
 
25 
Tarp, F., D. Ronald-Holst, and J. Rand. 2003. “Economic Structure and 
Development in an Emergent Asian Economy: Evidence From A Social 
Accounting Matrix For Vietnam,” Journal of Asian Economics, 13: 847-871. 
Thapa, P.J.  2001. “The Cost-Benefit of Land Reform,” Himal South Asia, October, 
2001.  
The World Bank. 2001.Community Forestry in Nepal, Operation Evaluation 
Department, No. 217, Washington, D.C. 
The World Bank. 1991. Nepal: Poverty and Income, World Bank country case 
study. Washington, D.C. 
The World Bank. 2001. World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty. 
Washington D.C. 
Thorbecke, E. 1998. “Social Accounting Matrices and Social Accounting 
Analysis,” In: W. Isard et al. (Editors), Methods of Interregional And Regional 
Analysis. Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company.   
Thorbecke, E., and Jung, Hong-Sang. 1996. “A Multiplier Decomposition Method 
to Analyze Poverty Alleviation,” Journal of Development Economics. 48: 279-
300. 
UNDP Poverty Report 2000, Overcoming Human Poverty. New York: UNDP. 
United States Agency of International Aid/ Department of States/ Peace Corps/ US 
Information Agency. 1973. United States interest and activities in Nepal: 
Report to Congress (B-177681), Washington D.C. 
Yadav, R. P. 1987. “Comments on Economic Policies and Performances in Nepal,” 
In Leo E. Rose (Editor) Nepal: Perspectives on Development Issues, 
Occasional Paper no 12, Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies. 
Berkeley: University of California.  
Zhang, J., and T. L. Darwin. 1994. “Modernization Theory Revisited: A Cross-
Cultural Study of Adolescent Conformity to Significant Others in Mainland 
China, Taiwan, and the USA,” Adolescence. 29: 885-904. 
Zivetz, L. 1992. Private Enterprise and the State in Modern Nepal. Madras: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
